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How Theory Meets Practice:
An Analysis of the Capital Structure of Spanish SMEs



Clara Cardone Riportella*
Carlos III University, Spain
and
Leonardo Cazorla Papis**
Universidad de Almería, Spain
The article analyzes the factors determining the capital structure of the Spanish small
and medium enterprises [SMEs]. The analysis is grounded on the agency theory, the
signalling approach and the pecking order theory. In particular, the article provides a
qualitative and quantitative analysis about the impact of company brand, the ownership and
control structure, and the relationship between the SMEs and their own financial policy. This
analysis is based on defining the expected relationships that one might consider between the
referred variables and the total debt ratio. In this regard, the analysis will be conducted by
means of considering a survey of 410 Spanish SMEs where an ANOVA test will be applied.
Then, a hierarchical regression model will allow comparison of the hypotheses made.



The authors acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Culture, Dirección
General de Proyectos de Investigación, projects SEC2001-1169 and SEJ2004-01688ECON. We are also grateful
to the anonymous referees and the Editors of this Journal.
*
Clara Cardone Riportella is an Associate Professor of Financial Economics and Accounting at the Department
of Business Administration at Carlos III University in Spain. She holds a Ph.D. in Business Administration from
the Universidad Autónoma of Madrid, and a Licentiate degree in Economics and Business Administration from
Universidad Nacional de Cuyo in Argentina. She teaches Financial Economics and International Finance to
undergraduate and post-graduate students. Her research interests focus on internationalization process, small and
medium enterprises financing and education quality MBA programs. She has been published in Geneva Papers
on Risk and Insurance, the Journal of the Academy of Business Education, and the International Small Business
Journal. Dr. Cardone has provided reviews and other services for The International Journal of Bank Marketing,
Investigaciones Económicas, and Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, and many others.
**
Leonardo Cazorla Papis is an Associate Professor of Financial Economics and Accounting at the Department
of Business Administration at Universidad de Almería in Spain. He holds a Ph.D. in Business Administration
from the Universidad de Almería, and a Licentiate degree in Economics and Business Administration, also from
the Universidad de Almería. He teaches financial economics to undergraduate and post-graduate students. His
research interests focus on internationalization process and small and medium enterprises financing (venture
capital). His work has been published in several journals, including The International Journal of Bank
Marketing, and Economía de la Empresa.

74

I.

How Theory Meets Practice… (Cardone and Cazorla)

Introduction
The article provides an explanatory analysis of the factors which determine the capital
structure of the Spanish small and medium enterprises [SMEs], by taking into account the
different theories based on the asymmetric information that each agent has to face. In
particular, the following theories will be considered: (i) the ‘agency theory’; (ii) the ‘signals
theory’ and (iii) the ‘pecking order theory’.
The decision about the capital structure is one of the most discussed aspects in
corporate finance, in fact, it is referred to the different categories of fund, equity and debt
(short and long term), that should be used by the company to fulfil their businesses plan. One
parameter of particular interest is the leverage ratio, which indicates the proportion of debt vs
equity (Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas, 2000). Therefore, the decision about the capital
structure deals with the best combination of the different financial fund that minimised the
cost of capital without compromising the business plan.
There are lots of studies regarding the decisions on capital structure, they all have
focused on two issues: (i) the determination of the optimal debt ratio that maximizes the
market value of the firm, and (ii) the determination of the different factors that influence the
financial decision.
Indeed, the decision about investment, financing and distribution of dividend must be
evaluated taking into account the impact that they may have on the business plan that the
company is intending to achieve, which in particular will be addressed to maximise the
market value of the company, since all the agents running in the sector will valuate the
performance by looking at the evolution of this value.
Therefore, it could be said that the optimal capital structure will be affected by the
debt policy of the company and any other exogenous parameter that might affect the decision
of capital structure. Literature has evolved from the ‘thesis of irrelevance’ developed in the
model of Modigliani and Miller (1958) to the analysis of the tax shield provided by income
taxes and its impact on corporations (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; De Angelo and Masulis,
1980) and individuals (Miller, 1977). In addition, the literature has evolved towards the
financial distress derived from insolvency and bankruptcy risks (Brennan and Schwartz, 1978;
Chen and Kim, 1979; Bradley, Jarrel and Kim, 1984) as well as the effect of asymmetric
information and the clash of interests between the agents involved, where can be found the
theories developed by (i) Jensen and Meckling, (1976), (ii) Ross, (1977); Leland and Pyle,
(1977), and (iii) Myers, (1984); Myers and Majluf, (1984); Pettit and Singer, (1985). That is
to say, the agency theory, the signalling approach, and the pecking order theory.
In recent years, a new theory studying the effects that business strategies have on the
capital structure decisions has been developed, this theory named the theory of business
strategies (Robson, Gallagher and Daly, 1994; Jordan, Lowe and Taylor, 1998) is based on
the influence of the managerial strategies on the financing decisions of the company. This
influence has two possible approaches: (i) the strategies related to the market where
companies compete; and (ii) the strategies concerning the production factors, where can be
highlighted the studies of Brander and Lewis (1986), Barton and Gordon (1988), Chatterjee
and Wernerfelt (1991), Balakrishnan and Fox (1993), Lowe, Naughton and Taylor (1994) and
Kochhar and Hitt (1998).
Although these theoretical approaches deal with capital structure from different
perspectives, they have in common the interest for ‘large’ corporations (Michaelas,
Chillenden and Poutziouris, 1999) against any consideration to SMEs, so that, only debt
patterns in ‘large’ companies are considered, without focusing on the effects on SMEs where
the application of most of the analytical tools mentioned above is difficult. For instance, one
of the most important differences between large scale enterprises and SMEs is the difficulty to
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get long-term funds from the capital markets since no daily and updated information about
them is available for investors because SMEs in many European countries1, do not quote in
the stock exchange. Because of that, the empirical test for the factors determining the capital
structure of SMEs has to be based on unquoted firms (Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Chittenden,
Hall and Hutchinson, 1995; Hull, Hutchinson and Michaelas, 2000; inter alia). Moreover, and
taking into account that SMEs funds usually come from different sources—credit markets for
SMEs and capital markets for large companies—it makes more sense to research the decision
on capital structure within the different groups of SMEs rather than research this decision by
analysing the differences between SMEs and large companies.
Credit markets usually are the unique possibility for SMEs to get funds; therefore,
lending relationships will be critical mechanisms for assessment and control. The existence of
asymmetric information and different interests between lenders and borrowers lead to ‘credit
rationing’ (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Therefore, the size of the SMEs, the lack of credit
ratings or covenants, along with concentration of ownership and control in the entrepreneur’s
hands, increase the asymmetric information, which results on poorer financial possibilities
and conditions for SMEs in the credit market (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Petersen
and Rajan, 1994, 1995).
When we look for the key factors that may explain the decision on capital structure, in
addition to the size, the number of employees, the total assets and the sales revenues, could be
found certain qualitative variables, such as market reputation, business experience, structure
and control of the ownership, as well as particular lending relationships that are likely to
become key issues for the SMEs financing. The capital structure of the SMEs has been
discussed by Keasey and Watson (1987), Storey, Watson and Wynarczyk (1988), Ang (1991,
1992), Reid (1993), Storey (1994), Robson, Gallagher and Daly (1994), Jordan, Lowe and
Taylor (1998), inter alia. In Spain, Maroto (1996), Boedo and Calvo (1997), Aybar, Casino
and López (2000), inter alia, have published outstanding studies in this field.
This article discusses the capital structure of SMEs by considering not only
quantitative variables, but also other qualitative or strategic variables. The paper is structured
as follows: after this brief introduction are summarized the different theoretical approaches,
then, the second section analyses the decision on capital structure. The third section, discusses
the peculiarities of the decision of SMEs regarding their capital structure by looking at what
the agency theory, pecking order theory and the signalling approach appoints. Section four,
identifies the variables and hypotheses that should be tested and compared in the empirical
analysis that will be conducted on section five. Then, section six presents the main
conclusions from the referred analysis.
II.

Theories applied to the decision on capital structure
The decision on capital structure consists on identifying the optimal combination of
debt and equity which maximizes the market value of the firm. Modigliani and Miller’s
(1958) proved that in perfect markets, the decision on capital structure becomes irrelevant.
Their study opened the debate and subsequent research on the influence of taxes and
bankruptcy costs on the capital structure of the company which may explain the current
borrowing policies (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) by means of the so-called ‘compensation
theory’. This theory represents a trade-off between the positive and negative effects of the
financial leverage (Myers, 1984).

1

In Spain, according to the data from European SMEs´ Laboratory, SMEs, represent 99.89% of the companies,
70 % of the exports and nearly 60% of the imports, etc.
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A number of other imperfections arising from asymmetric information and clashes of
interests between the different agents (shareholders, managers and lenders) has to be
considered too. In this regard, the agency theory was a significant step toward a qualitative
attempt to explain the decision on capital structure, in difference to previous theoretical
approaches. The contractual model of the enterprise proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976)
provided a new theoretical and conceptual framework that permitted the introduction of other
explanatory factors. Among the many contracts that might define the nature of organizations,
the agency theory focuses on the financial contracts established between the organization and
the providers of liabilities, leading to two agency relationships: (i) the ‘managerial
relationship’ established between shareholders and managers, i.e., between the owners of the
capital and the management board of the enterprise; and (ii) the ‘borrowing relationship’
established between the lenders and the shareholders. The asymmetric information and the
clashes of interests between the different agents spawn conflict and agency costs. Thus, it
could be said that every financial structure is characterized by certain agency costs because of
possible losses that both, shareholders and lenders might suffer from possible opportunistic
behaviours from managers or owners of capital. These agency costs affect the market value of
the securities and the company itself; therefore, an optimal capital structure minimizes the
total agency costs. On the other hand, the agency theory analyses how the borrowing policy
may reduce the conflicts of agency that may arise between shareholders and managers. On top
of that, the agency theory also analyses the conflicts that characterize the relationship between
the shareholders and the fund petitioners in the financial borrowing contracts, which also
determine the shareholders’ willingness to grant funds, leading to situations of credit rationing
(Harris and Raviv, 1991).
The shareholders’ attitude to risk may influence their preferences in the process of
designing the financial policy of the company. According to the pecking order theory, the
enterprises organize borrowing from a hierarchical point of view (Myers, 1984; Pettit and
Singer, 1985), that is to say, the management board has a greater preference for internal funds
rather than for external funds, which are only available when there are opportunities of
profitable investment, or when self-financing is insufficient. In that case, the management
board prefers borrowing, and only uses share issues as a last resort; in this way, they avoid
sharing the business opportunities with entrants, since this transmits negative information to
the market (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). This hierarchical order is of particular
interest for the SMEs because of the high costs of external financing that must be accounted
for (Pettit and Singer, 1985; Ang, 1991; Cosh and Hughes, 1994; Holmes and Kent, 1991),
and according to Myers (1984), the main consequence of the asymmetric information which
exists in the credit market (Michaelas et al., 1999).
The signalling approach establishes propositions about the sense and intensity of the
response of the market value of the assets in case of changes in the capital structure. The idea
behind this approach is that the market acts as a supervisor and controller of the managerial
function, at the same time, it assesses the financial decisions of the company as an indicator or
a signal about the expected cash-flows and solvency of those companies (Ross, 1977; Leland
and Pyle, 1977).
III.

The decision on the capital structure within the context of the SMEs
‘Large companies’ have been the reference for corporate finance. This type of
companies are mainly characterized by: (i) the separation and specialization of ownership and
control; (ii) the dispersal of the ownership among a considerable number of shareholders; (iii)
the usage of markets of shares and bonds as a way to get funds; and (iv) the role of the capital
markets as a mechanism of assessment and control. Therefore, these assessments and control
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by means of the market quotations becomes the departing point for the analysis of the
financial decisions of the company, in particular for those decisions related to the capital
structure. However, it looks reasonable to analyse the capital structure of SMEs in this
theoretical framework.
The literature about the analysis of the financial decisions has traditionally stressed the
importance of quantitative variables related to the volume of assets, business turnover or
number of workers. Nevertheless, and in addition to these quantitative variables recent
research has highlighted the importance of qualitative factors.
The limitations found by the SMEs when are intending to have access to the capital
markets, the markets of assets and bonds and the fact of not negotiating their own assets in a
secondary organized market, provokes the absence of a reasonable mechanism of assessment
and control for this type of companies.
In fact, since the SMEs are not publicly traded, it is not feasible to analyse decisions
related to capital structure by considering their effect on the financial objective of maximizing
the market value of the company. The financial dependency of the small companies from the
bank credit market leads to consider the lending relationship as the best reference to analyse
the capital structure. Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) prove that the debt ratio decreases with
the age of the company and it increases with the size. Therefore, those companies which are
younger are expected to turn to finance companies with third-party resources, whereas mature
or established companies are self-financed (Berger and Udell, 1992, 1995; inter alia).
The concentration of ownership and control of the SMEs may have important
consequences on their financing decisions. The lack of specialization and the overlap between
the roles of the entrepreneur and the owner leads to a lack of delegation of authority.
Therefore, the decision-making is concentrated in a single person, which provokes
opportunistic behaviours by the owner-manager who, in turn, has a major part of his/her
personal and family wealth invested in the company. Moreover, owners have unlimited
responsibility. Thus, if there exists a lack of specialization, there will be a clear identification
of the entrepreneur figure (owner-manager) with the company in such a way that the
development of the SMEs will be closely linked to the entrepreneur’s life.
These circumstances increase the level of asymmetric information and clash of
interests that exist between the different agents involved in the borrowing contracts. The
agency approach, the hypotheses based on the theory of signals, and the pecking order
theory, are the bases for analysing the capital structure in the case of SMEs.
IV.

Variables and relationships to be considered in the model
Grounding on the rules established by the agency theory, the pecking order theory and
the signalling approach, and considering the unique characteristics of the SMEs, the factors
determining the capital structure have been grouped in two blocks: (i) quantitative variables
related to ‘size’; and (ii) three qualitative variables related to the ‘reputation’ of the enterprise,
the structure of ‘ownership and control’, and the ‘lending relationship’. This article defines
the capital structure of the firm as a function of the debt ratio; i.e.: the relationship between
the debt (short- and long-term) and the total resources.
A.
Size
The size of the company allows the lenders to calculate their own market power and,
indirectly estimate the risk of insolvency. The greater the volume of assets, profits, sales or
employees, the greater the capacity of self-financing and the probability of diversify correctly
so that, the solvency and the capacity to pay interest will increase as well. The size is, related
to other group of variables that determine the capital structure of the company. Thus, large
companies present higher levels of investment, because they have a greater capacity to offer
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covenants to the lender. On the other hand, if economies of scale related to the acquisition of
new information are considered, then it will be proportionally more expensive for lenders to
supervise a SME than a ‘large’ enterprise. Furthermore, SMEs usually find harder to fulfil the
information requirements established in the financial markets. Finally, the size of the
company has been one of the factors which explain the structure and concentration of
ownership.
The larger the company, the greater the separation between ownership and control,
and the dispersion of the capital. The possibility that the board shows opportunistic
behaviours against the interests of external shareholders explains the frequent usage of
borrowing as an external mechanism to control the managerial function. According to the
agency theory and the signals approach, a positive relationship between the size and the level
of borrowing in the enterprise should be expected. However, from the point of view of the
pecking order theory, the larger the volume of fixed assets, the larger the sinking funds and,
hence, the bigger the self-financing. Therefore, there is a negative relationship with the debt
ratio.
H.1.a: Size—measured by the number of employees, volume of sales and
volume of assets—will be positively related to the debt ratio (agency
theory and signals approach).
H.1.b: Size—measured by the number of employees, volume of sales and
volume of assets—will be negative related to the debt ratio (pecking
order theory).
B.
Reputation of the company
One of the factors that may reduce the agency costs of borrowing (especially those
originating from over-investment), is the ‘reputation of the company’ (Diamond, 1989; John
and Natchman, 1985). Diamond (1989) suggests that the ‘reputation of the company’ may be
measured as a function of variables such as the age of the company. The reputation is
reflected by the availability to obtain the required finance. The observation that capital
markets does of the SMEs satisfying the contractual obligations over a long period of time is
one of the most valuable intangible assets of these companies since the credit market
accumulates this information. The ‘reputation’ is related to the capacity of the company to
tackle the commitment of payments, i.e., the repayment of the principal and interest2. The
managers’ willingness to preserve these intangible assets discourages opportunistic decisionmaking and high-risk investments are rejected in favour of more secure projects, thereby
diminishing the agency costs of the borrowing derived from decisions leading to overinvestment. Consequently, according to the agency theory and the signals approach, the
longer the service the greater the reputation in the credit market. Then, the greater will be the
possibilities to get funds.

2

The SMEs enter the credit market with low-quality and insufficient information, which increases the
information asymmetries that already exist, although, in Norton’s opinion (1991), these information differences
depend on the ‘stage or life cycle’ that the enterprise is going through. During the growing stage of the SME, the
financial markets have little or no information about it. It is for this reasons that self-financing and very shortterm borrowing prevail as sources of fund-raising. During the development stage, the SMEs steadily consolidate
their position in both markets and the success or the failure of their projects, as well as the fulfilment of their
financial compromises, permit the development of relationships with the financial companies that may facilitate
their access to the credit market with more favourable conditions, and so establish capital structures based on
long-term borrowing. Once in their maturity stage, SMEs have access to the capital market and it is during this
period that bonds are issued, projects are developed by means of financial mediators (e.g., Loan Guarantee
Association or Capital Venture Enterprises), and the growth in capital is more important as a source of finance.
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The ‘reputation’ may also be measured as a function of the number of years that the
company has been owned by the entrepreneur. The low specialization that generally exists in
these companies with respect to the ownership and control, and the owner-managers’
reluctance to delegate responsibilities, creates a greater dependency that SMEs have on the
owner-manager. When this person leaves the position —due to death, illness, retirement, job
turnover, etc.—problems of succession may arise provoking the lost of credibility and
reputation and leading to the demise of the company. Consequently, changes of ownership are
similar to create and set up a new company, which provokes the asymmetric information and
the risk perceived by the lender (Boedo and Calvo, 1997). When the age of the company is
analysed in terms of the development cycle, the youngest and the most dynamic companies
tend to use their own resources intensely, as well as the bank debt and commercial short-term
debt, to face the problems of liquidity (Weston and Brigham, 1981). Because of the difficulty
to obtain permanent funds (borrowed and own capital), these companies survive they match
the growth rate to their own capacity of self-financing. Therefore, the age will be negatively
associated, in general, with the short-term debt and positively associated with the long-term
debt. Consequently, the youngest companies are expected to have lower levels of debt.
Therefore, a positive relationship is expected to occur between the numbers of years that the
companies belong to the existing owner, and the level of borrowing.
On the other hand, there is a direct relationship between the age and the size of the
companies. In general, as time goes by and the company increases in experience and position
within the market, new strategies for growth based on increasing the investment in assets and
human resources (employment) might appear. These strategies increase sales and revenues as
well as self-financing possibilities (Norton, 1991). According to the pecking order theory,
when companies have more internal funds, they prefer to use them, and they will borrow only
when self-financing is insufficient. Therefore, following this theory, there is a negative
relationship between reputation and debt ratio.
H.2.a: Reputationmeasured by the number of years that the company has
been providing services and the numbers of years belonging to the
current owner will be positively related to the debt ratio (agency
theory and signals approach).
H.2.b: Reputationmeasured by the number of years that the company has
been providing services and the number of years belonging to the
current owner will be negatively related to the debt ratio (pecking
order theory).
C.
Ownership structure.
The relationship between the SMEs and the lenders is, characterized by the structure
of ownership and control in the company. Two major types of SMEs can be distinguished: (i)
those where the manager is the owner of the entire capital; and (ii) the medium-sized family
companies where the functions of ownership and management are separated. Two important
groups of interest can be identified: (a) the owner-managers; and (b) the external owners that
do not sit on the management board (Ang, 1991, 1992).
If capital and control are in hands of a few agents and the clash of interests between
managers and shareholders is low, the usage of borrowing as a mechanism for supervising
and controlling managerial functions might not be necessary because lenders deal with fewer
agents (e.g., owner-directors). Under this scenario the asymmetric information is reduced and
the agents are more controlled. Thus, according to the agency theory, a positive relationship
between the specialization level and the separation of functions in the ownership and control
and the debt ratio exists. Nevertheless, the pecking order theory points out that, when no
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separation exists the owner-manager has to invest a major part of his/her personal wealth and
there is no potential for using retained earnings, SMEs tend to prefer borrowing to avoid
involving outsiders and lose the control of the decision-making.
H.3.a: The specialization and separation of the ownership and control
functions are positively related to the debt ratio (agency theory and
signals approach).
H.3.b: The specialization and separation of the ownership and control
functions are negatively related to the debt ratio (pecking order
theory).
D.
Characteristics of the lending relationship
The possibilities of raising funds in the credit market may also be determined by the
features characterizing the relationship between the lender and the borrower (Petersen and
Rajan, 1994). Three explanatory variables have been considered in this respect: (i) the age of
the relationship with the main financial company; (ii) the number of financial companies; and
(iii) the existence of covenants, as well as their nature.
The experience of past relationships along with the information that the lender has
about the borrower cuts the analysis of costs. Conversely, in the case of new applicants for
funds, lenders may have the information provided by the SMEs themselves or the information
obtained from external sources, such as other lenders or rating agencies. For these reasons, the
asymmetric information depends on the age of the lending relationship in such a way that
those companies that maintain a long-standing relationship are expected to get credits more
easily. The theory suggests that those companies with a closer association to financial
companies usually have lower costs of capital and greater availability of funds. Consequently,
according to the rules of the agency theory and the signals approach, a positive relationship is
expected to find between the duration of the lending relationship and the level of borrowing.
H.4.a: The length of the lending relationship is directly related to the debt
ratio.
The availability to get credits might be determined by the number of financial
companies that the borrower maintains a relationship with. The greater the number of
financial entities dealing with the borrower, the smaller the availability to get credits and the
greater the price (interest) paid for that credit, as Petersen and Rajan (1994) proved.
H.4.b: The number of financial companies dealing with the SMEs is
inversely related to the debt ratio.
The covenants that the owner-manager decides to provide, and their nature, may be a
signal about the future earnings that the entrepreneur-owner expects from the investment
undertaken (Stiglitz, 1987). The cost of losing these assets in bankruptcy is the enticement
that asserts the validity of that signal and transmits positive information to the lenders about
the borrowing capacity of the company. From the point of view of the borrowing decision,
more funds will be available to the entrepreneur willing to provide more covenants with a
personal nature, or related to assets that do not belong to the company. The signal is greater
when the covenants are personal or real, or when they are related to assets that do not belong
to the business activity. Therefore, according to the agency theory and the signal approach,
there is a positive relationship between the existence of those covenants and the debt ratio.

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures, Vol. 11, Iss. 2

81

H.4.c.: The existence of covenants in the borrowing contracts by the SMEs is directly
related to the debt ratio.
As was stated above, the objective of this study is to make an exploratory analysis on
the nature of the factors determining the capital structure in the case of SMEs. The debt ratio
has been considered as a representative and dependent variable of the capital structure. In this
regard, the debt ratio is defined as the relation between the total debt—short- and long-term—
and the total resources. Explanatory variables might be grouped in four blocks.





Block 1: related to size; three variables are considered: (i) SIZE1 related to the number of
employees; (ii) SIZE2 related to the volume of sales; and (iii) SIZE3 related to the total
value of the net assets.
Block 2: comprises the variables of the company reputation. Two variables are
considered: (i) AGE1 related to the age of the company; and (ii) AGE2 related to the
number of years that the company belongs to the current owner.
Block 3: related to the structure of ownership and control; variable DIR is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if a non-owner manages the enterprise.
Block 4: comprises the variables defining the lending relationship; five variables included
in this group: (i) NFC: number of financial companies with which the company maintains
a relationship; (ii) AR: measures the age of the relationship with the main financial
company, and (iii) PERC, REALCUNR and REALCR, which measure, respectively,
whether the company provides covenants of a personal or real nature, related or unrelated
to the activity of the enterprise, and owned or not owned by the company.

In addition, the model includes the main activities of the SMEs as a control variable.
The variables named after the abbreviations INDSEC, COMSEC, CONSEC and SERSEC,
serve to identify whether the enterprise belongs to industry, commerce, construction or
services, respectively.
V.

Empirical analysis
A.
Data and methodology
The relationships outlined in the model are compared by means of an empirical analysis with
a sample of 13,200 SMEs of the ‘Spanish Guide of Exporting Enterprises’. The study was
conducted by an email questionnaire sent during the period November 1999 to January 2000.
410 companies correctly answer to the questionnaire, which represent 3,1%3 of the companies
surveyed.
To clarify the relationships, which are established between the independent variables
and the TBR, the survey has been divided into four groups according to the values that the
ratio may have. Group I comprises those companies with low levels of borrowing, and debt
ratio inferior to 25%. Group 2 includes companies with debt ratios between 25% and 50%.
Group 3 are companies with debt ratios between 50 and 75%, and Group 4 represents those
companies with debt ratios above 75%.

3

The use of email questionnaires is worthy of further discussion as this method is likely to become of increasing
importance in the future. However, the reasons for and implications of using this approach are not discussed.
Some of the advantages of using email questionnaires are: (i) the speed; (ii) the saving in time and money; and
(iii) their greater impact. Some of the disadvantages are: (i) the questionnaire fails if the interviewee requires help
to respond, (ii) there is no anonymity, which may be an important consideration when answering, and (iii) the
limited installation of the Internet in Spain (the penultimate one among EU countries, before Greece, Nielsen
Netratings, July, 2001), mainly in small and medium-sized companies.
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The existence of significant differences between the groups is analysed by considering
the independent variables by means of an ANOVA. Table I describes the statistical features of
the sample and the company groups considered as well as the results of the ANOVA.
Significant differences can be observed with respect to the following variables: (i) number of
employees; (ii) volume of total net assets; (iii) number of financial companies that the
enterprise maintains a relationship with; (iv) age of the relationship with the main financial
company; and (v) existence of real covenants unrelated to the business.
Finally, and in order to contrast the hypotheses established in the theoretical part, and
to analyse the combined effect of the explanatory variables on the debt ratio, a model of
hierarchical regression was developed, consisting of the introduction of groups of variables
corresponding to the four blocks considered into the regression equation, size, reputation,
structure of ownership and control, and characteristics of the lending relationship.
B.
Results
The companies in the survey have an average of 35 employees, an average volume of
sales of €4.27 million and average net assets of €2.09 million. The companies with less
borrowing (Group 1) are generally smaller enterprises, in terms of number of employees and
business turnover, however, larger companies have debt ratios of 25% to 50%. Although the
differences are statistically significant for the number of employees and volume of assets, the
analysis of the data does not seem to confirm the relationships that might be expected in
theory; that is to say, fulfilment of H.1.a, the larger the size of the company, the higher the
debt ratio. However, since H.1.b is satisfied, the results are not contradictory with those
obtained in the studies of Peterson and Schulman (1987); Holmes and Kent, (1991).
Therefore, large companies usually have higher capitalization rates and, consequently, lower
levels of borrowing as the pecking order theory predicts.
With respect to the ‘main activity within the sector’, 39% of the companies belong to
the sector of services, 29% of them to the industry sector and 22% to the sector of commerce.
Although there are no significant differences between groups, except in the case of the
construction sector, companies with high levels of borrowing belong to the industry sector,
whereas those other companies with low levels of borrowing belong to the sector of services.
With respect to the ‘reputation of the company, measured by the age of the firm
(AGE1), the companies included in the survey have an average age of 20 years. In particular
the companies which belong to Group 1, are characterised by the lowest levels of borrowing,
at the same time, those companies which belong to Group 4, have the highest levels of
borrowing and are the youngest companies of the sample. The companies which belong to
Group 2, with a debt ratio between 25% and 50%, are the most long-standing and experienced
companies. Therefore, AGE1 is statistically significant for all the groups, and the analysis of
the data does not confirm the theoretical relationship established by the agency theory and
signalling theory, H.2.a; however, it confirms the relationship established by the pecking
order theory, H.2.b. Concerning the variable AGE2, the number of years being the current
owner provides similar results.
With respect to the ‘structure of ownership and control’ of the companies included in
the survey, non-owners manage only 11,48% of the companies. As might be expected in
SMEs companies, generally there is no clear separation of functions since the ownership and
control of the company is at the owner’s hands. However, no sign of significant differences
between the different categories of groups can be observed. In this regard, from the analysis
of the data no confirmation of any relationship between the agency theory and the signals
approach; therefore H.3.a is not fulfilled. However, this relationship can be confirmed under
the pecking order theory, H.3.b.
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From the main characteristics that define the lending relationship point of view, can be
highlighted that there are four financial companies associated to the companies included in the
survey. Moreover, the ANOVA reveals some statistically significant differences between the
groups studied. On average, companies with the lowest borrowing level (Group 1) deal with
three companies, whereas those with the highest borrowing level (Group 4) deal with five;
therefore, those companies with higher borrowing, on average, deal with more companies.
However, the sense of H.4.b in the relationship between this variable and the debt ratio cannot
be confirmed.
This result, which is the opposite of Peterson and Rajan’s (1994), is a consequence of
the characteristics of the Spanish credit market, which is highly specialized and very
fragmented. Indeed, the Savings Banks of the Comunidades Autónomas are the main lenders
to SMEs.
Concerning the ‘age of the relationship with the main financial company’, the age of
the relationship for the groups under survey is only 3,77 years, which is rather recent in
comparison to the average age of the companies included in the survey (20.47 years). This
may indicate, the existence of great competition in the current credit market, so that many
entrepreneurs frequently change companies. In a similar way, some statistically significant
differences are noticed between groups. The age of the relationship is generally smaller for
those companies with the lowest levels of borrowing, which indeed confirms H4.a.
The descriptive analysis can be concluded by doing a reference to the importance of
covenants, as well as to their nature, although it must be remarked that the number of
responses and cases surveyed in relation to these variables is considerably lower—273 cases.
Out of these cases, 20% have covenants of a personal or real type unrelated to the business,
and 18% have real covenants related to the activity. The percentages become larger in those
companies where the debt ratio is greater, which confirms H.4.c at the 10% significance level;
however, it is only in cases of real covenants unrelated to the business where the differences
between groups are statistically significant.
A model of hierarchical regression has been proposed across-the-board to compare the
referred hypotheses. Before doing so, the array of correlations between the variables had to be
computed, and was observed a high correlation between the variables SIZE1, SIZE2 and
SIZE3. For this reason, the variable corresponding to the Napier’s logarithm of the volume of
total net assets was introduced in the regression model as an explanatory variable for size
In the first step, the variable LSIZE3 and those variables of control related to sectors
of main activity were included; resulting that only the volume of assets is statistically
significant. Thus, the relationship established at H.1.a is confirmed, that is to say, the larger
the volume of assets, the larger the debt ratio.
In the second step, the variables related to the reputation of the enterprise, AGE1 and
AGE2 were added to the previous variables. In this case, the variable size related to the
volume of assets still is statistically significant, which does not confirm the hypothesis related
to the variable ‘reputation’. However, with respect to the variable AGE1, the relationship is
negative as suggested by the pecking order theory.
In a third step, the variable DIR related to the structure of ownership and control was
added to the previous variables. In this case, the variable volume of assets results statistically
significant. Therefore, the sense of the relationship is the one observed according to the
pecking order theory, even though it is not statistically significant.
In the fourth step, two more variables related to the characteristics of the lending
relationship were added to the previous variables; NFC (number of financial companies) and
AR (age of the relationship). In this case, the variable related to the size of the company
becomes statistically insignificant, whereas the ‘number of financial companies’ is significant.
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In the array of correlations, both variables are correlated in such a way that companies with
larger size usually deal with more financial companies; this fact favours their access to the
credit market. In this sense, the hypothesis established in the theoretical model may be
confirmed. Concerning variable AR, the sense of the relationship is the opposite.
Consequently, the ‘age of the relationship with the main financial company’ is not an
explanatory factor of the capital structure. This is because of the features of the credit market,
which is very competitive and, thus, the change of company becomes a normal practice
among the enterprises. Petersen and Rajan (1994) found contrary results.
As can be seen the negative and positive signs depend on the sense of the relationship:
positive, indicates a direct relationship; and negative indicates an inverse relationship between
the dependent and independent variable.
Finally, in the fifth step, the variables related to the covenants are added to the
previous ones. In the model of total regression where all the factors are included, the
statistically significant variables that are explanatory of the debt ratio are the number of
financial companies (NFC) and the existence of personal covenants (PERC). Both factors are
positively related to the debt ratio, which confirms the hypotheses established in the
theoretical model.
VI.

Summary and concluding remarks
Although the low response level obtained in the survey could limit the interpretation
of the results, we consider that this research provides interesting ideas about the decision of
capital structure for SMEs.
Therefore, this study provides an explanatory analysis of the nature of the factors
which determine the capital structure of SMEs. The distinctive features of this type of
companies are: (i) the impossibility of using equity markets and, therefore, the absence of
objective mechanisms of assessment; (ii) the dependence of this type of companies from the
bank credit market; and (iii) the presence of a structure of ownership and control that is
characterized by no separating both functions.
All these circumstances have two important consequences. On one hand, the degree of
asymmetric information among the different agents involved in the market is increased; the
agency theory, the pecking order theory and the signals approach theory are the optimal
conceptual referential frameworks for studying the decisions related to the capital structure in
the case of SMEs. On the other hand, a reconsideration of the analysis is required; the
relationship LR in the credit market is the ideal referential framework or unit of analysis.
In the specific case of SMEs and in addition to the importance of quantitative
variables related to size, other qualitative variables related to reputation, structure of
ownership and control, and characteristics of the lending relationship, seem to be relevant
factors to take into account in the analysis of the decisions about capital structure.


Size of the enterprise: even though the differences are statistically significant for the
number of employees and volume of assets, the analysis of the data does not confirm the
relationships that might be expected according to the agency theory and the signals
approach, the larger the size, the higher the debt ratio. Although it confirms the
relationships from the pecking order theory, the size will be negatively related to the debt
ratio. Indeed, the negative relationship between the level of debt and the size coincides
with the pecking order theory, but is opposite to that expected from the agency theory and
the signal approach, so that bigger companies with greater levels of self-financing will
have lower debt requirements.
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Reputation of the company (age): with respect to the variable (AGE1), although the
differences are statistically significant between groups for this variable, the analysis of the
data does not confirm the relationship that might be expected according to the agency
theory or to the signal approach (H.2.a). However, it does confirm the relationship
between the variables according to the pecking order theory (H.2.b). With respect to
variable AGE2 (years in possession of the current owner), the results are similar; that is,
H.2 would not be fulfilled. The difficulties of testing the variable ‘reputation’ come from
the unit used in the quantification, age of the company as measured by the number of
years since the company commenced. Other empirical works, such as Boedo y Calvo
(1997), suggest that the age of the company is, among others, a component of reputation,
which integrates many qualitative and quantitative aspects. In any case, age, as the
empirical results suggest, may be negatively related to the level of debt. Therefore, those
companies that are just starting usually incur losses or low profit levels, because their
self-financing possibilities are constrained, which makes debt the best way to obtain
funds in the short term. As these companies continue in the marketplace and gain the
experience needed to survive, their performance will improve and they will require less
debt.



Structure of ownership and control: those enterprises with higher level of specialization in
the functions have a lower level of borrowing. It may be confirmed that the direction of
the relationship is negative, in the same way as the pecking order theory suggests, even
though it is not statistically significant in the regression model. The results suggest that
smaller companies are usually managed by one director, who owns the main proportion
of capital, and thus avoids the entrance of another agent. As the pecking order theory
suggests, in those cases where self-financing is not sufficient, debt is preferred to the
issuing of shares because the entrance of new owners is supposed to diminish the control
of the director.



Characteristics of the ‘lending relationship’: the results obtained in the regression confirm
the existence of relationships for the number of entities and the availability of personal
guarantees. As has been argued, the credit market is the main point of reference for
obtaining funds, especially for Spanish SMEs. The literature suggests that the stronger the
relationship between the financial entity and the company, the lower the constraints to
obtain funds. However, the results achieved predict a negative relationship between the
debt ratio and the age of the relationship with the financial entity. Although this result is
not unexpected when we observe the level of competence and fragmentation of the
current credit market. The low interest rates and the appearance of new financial entities
have increased the level of competition in the market. Nowadays, the relationship with
the financial entity is not such an important factor because of the facilities to change the
financial institution. Companies usually work with more financial entities, and establish
specialized relationships depending on the financial services. In any case, the results point
out that the availability of guarantees is a key factor to obtain funds from the credit
market. At the same time, the availability of guarantees reduces the asymmetric
information and the uncertainty in the relationship between the borrower and lender.
Furthermore, the guarantees reduce the possibility of losses for the lender in case of
insolvency. Finally, the guarantees can be seen as a positive signal to the lender because it
indicates that insolvency is unlikely; therefore, entrepreneurs who are able to offer more
guarantees will have lower constraints to get funds from the credit market. In 20% of the
cases in our survey, the companies have covenants of a personal or real type not related to
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the business, and 18% have real covenants related to the activity. Between groups, the
percentages are higher for those companies that have a higher debt ratio, which confirms
H.4.c, even though it is only the differences between groups for the case of the real
covenants not related to the business that are statistically significant.
Although the analysis of the regression does not provide empirical evidence of the
impact of the variables on the capital structure of SMEs, the research allows us to conclude
that the pecking order theory is a more useful instrument for explaining the relationship
between the dependent and independent variables, age, size, property structure and control.
As the results point out, there is evidence that the pecking order theory is an acceptable
approach to be applied to SMEs. The self-financing possibilities and maintenance of the
control are two explanatory factors of the capital structure of SMEs, as well as the impact of
the availability guarantees on the relationship between the borrower and the lender.
The results of the study are in line with the latest research, which, owing to the low
number of studies and the rather inconclusive results generally obtained, is still in its initial
phases.
In spite of the difficulties of studying the financial decisions within the specific field
of SMEs, we believe that it would be useful in the future to: (i) continue studying in more
detail the demand factors, that is, the internal variables of the enterprise that determine these
types of decisions; and (ii) incorporate into these studies an analysis of the supply factors that
are related to the characteristics of the financial markets.
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Table I
Main features of each group and the ANOVA
No.

Std.
Mean

Cases
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
(Number of employees)
Group 4
Global
Group 1
SIZE2
Group 2
Group 3
(Volume of sales)
Group 4
Global
Group 1
SIZE3
Group 2
Group 3
(Volume of net total assets)
Group 4
Global
Group 1
INDSEC
Group 2
Group 3
(Industry activity sector)
Group 4
Global
Group 1
COMSEC
Group 2
Group 3
(Commerce sector)
Group 4
Global
Group 1
CONSEC
Group 2
Group 3
(Construction sector)
Group 4
Global
Group 1
SERSEC
Group 2
Group 3
(Services sector)
Group 4
Global
Group 1
AGE1
Group 2
(Years since the commercial activity Group 3
Group 4
began)
Global
Group 1
Group 2
AGE2
Group 3
Group 4
(Years in possession of the current
Global
SIZE1

owner)

74
19.57
58
53.08
114
36.32
146
34.21
392
34.85
71 592.44
58 1117.33
112 671.95
138 629.44
379 709.73
44 545.29
46 911.29
84 479.22
100 346.89
274 514.07
75 0.2267
58 0.3621
112 0.2857
146 0.3014
391 0.2916
75 0.1733
58 0.2414
112 0.2411
146 0.2123
391 0.2174
75 0.00533
58 0.0017
112 0.1161
146 0.1027
391 0.00844
75 0.5333
58 0.3793
112 0.3125
146 0.3699
391 0.3862
76
18.5
58
27.28
114
21.86
145
17.69
393
20.47
77
15.43
57
18.72
110
19.21
144
14.38
388
16.59

Minimum Maximum F(ANOVA)
Deviation
25.69
82.58
50.47
43.12
42.97
1679.8
2946.27
1069.45
1228.73
1656.93
1595.82
1466.75
811.97
746.16
1093.36
0.4215
0.4848
0.4538
0.4604
0.4551
0.3811
0.4317
0.4297
0.4104
0.413
0.2262
0.1313
0.3218
0.3047
0.2783
0.5022
0.4895
0.4656
0.4844
0.4875
19.08
29.01
20.74
16.75
20.74
15.32
22.95
21.64
12.83
17.88

1
2
1
1
1
2
8
1
0
0
0
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

130
240
239
226
240
10228
21000
6254
8629
21000
10096
6300
4149
6315
10096
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
84
140
107
100
140
84
140
140
80
140

0.025

0.035

0.093

0.018
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Table I, continued
Main features of each group and the ANOVA
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
(Managed by a non-owner)
Group 4
Global
Group 1
NFC
Group 2
Group 3
(Number of finance companies)
Group 4
Global
Group 1
AR
Group 2
(Age of the relationship with the main finance company) Group 3
Group 4
Global
Group 1
PERC
Group 2
Group 3
(Personal covenants)
Group 4
Global
Group 1
REALCUNR
Group 2
Group 3
(Real covenants unrelated to the business activity)
Group 4
Global
Group 1
REALCR
Group 2
Group 3
(Real covenants related to the business activity)
Group 4
Global
DIR

77
58
114
143
392
75
58
115
147
395
49
51
113
134
347
44
32
85
112
273
42
32
85
112
271
44
31
84
112
271

0.1169
0.1379
0.1316
0.0090
0.1148
3.32
3.93
4.5
4.47
4.18
3.2
4.2
4.04
3.59
3.77
0.14
0.19
0.19
0.23
0.2
0.12
0.0093
0.27
0.21
0.2
0.11
0.0096
0.19
0.22
0.18

0.3234
0.3478
0.3395
0.2885
0.3192
2.72
3.96
2.8
3.01
3.08
1.44
1.91
1.39
1.22
1.45
0.35
0.4
0.39
0.42
0.4
0.33
0.3
0.45
0.41
0.4
0.32
0.3
0.4
0.42
0.39

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
16
30
17
15
30
5
15
13
5
15
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.033

<0.001

0.083

NOTE:
Group 1: Comprises those enterprises with low borrowing levels, which have total debt ratios of
less than or equal to 25%.
Group 2: Includes enterprises with total debt ratios between 25% and 50%.
Group 3: Consists of enterprises with total debt ratios between 50% and 75%.
Group 4: Represents those enterprises with total debt ratios above 75%.
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Table II

Hierarchical regression model

VARIABLES

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

41.441
46.788
44.432
27.692
35.662
(Constant)
12.486** 13.495** 14.018**
–0.576
–3.046
LSIZE3
(Volume of net total assets)
–39.441 –40.997 –38.782 –38.379 –45.166
INDSEC
(Industry activity sector)
–30.644 –32.402 –31.198 –32.385 –32.527
COMSEC
(Commerce sector)
–17.224 –20,597 –21.367 –12.070 –11.336
CONSEC
(Construction sector)
4.456
.562
2.926
29.200
30.504
SERSEC
(Services sector)
–0.664
–0.573
–0.128
–0.412
AGE1
(Years since the main activity began)
0.371
0.296
–0.438
–0.294
AGE2
(Years in possession of the current
owner)
–31.106 –32.674 –21.925
DIR
(Managed by a non-owner)
24.519** 24.119**
NFC
*
*
(Number of finance companies)
–7.130
–9.241
AR
(Age of the relationship with the main
finance company)
69.242*
PERC
(PERSONAL covenants)
33.325
REALCUNR
(REAL covenants unrelated to the
business activity)
–24.400
REALCR
(REAL covenants related to the
business activity)
Dependent variable: total debt (TBR)
 * Significant at 5%


** Significant at 2%



*** Significant at 1%
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Figure 1
Variables and proposed relationships
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